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Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, Vol. 21, No. 2, 75-85 (1997)
DOI: 10.1177/109634809702100206

The Ownership Structure of Property Rights: Theory and Empirical Evidence of Restaurant Franchising

Yae Sock Roh

University of New Hampshire

Heung Michael Kwag

Boston University

This study examines the ownership structure of restaurant franchising by comparing and contrasting capital market and agency explanations. The primary emphasis is placed on evaluation of these competing theories based on empirical data related to the major determinants of ownership structure that concerns restaurant franchising systems. Comprehensive data from specific individual restau rant franchisors are used in this study. In contrast to previous conjectures made in hospitality literature, this study finds that the choice of organizational form (company ownership versus franchising) is largely influenced by agency costs.

Key Words: Key words: ownership structure • franchising • capital constraint • agency problem.


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